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Abstract 
The paper examines cryptocurrency in the crypto-finance ecosystem and identifies 
areas in which regulatory intervention is required. Part I focuses on the system and 
processes of cryptocurrency and identifies the features of this ‘decentralised’ system 
and the legal and regulatory implications. Part II discusses the perceived benefits and 
the rise of cryptocurrency to determine whether those benefits fit with regulatory 
objectives and contribute to the rise of cryptocurrency. Part III discusses the fall of 
cryptocurrency and some associated factors, particularly a lack of governance. Part 
IV discusses the need for regulation and governance.
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I. Introduction
The crypto-finance phenomenon has prompted much regulatory attention. This new, 
distributed system directly challenges the supervisory powers of the central banks 
and the regulatory structure that is currently in place. One type of crypto-finance is 
cryptocurrency – a facility for token payment and non-cash payment.1 Cryptocurrency 
is a payment product in which a person’s identity does not need to be disclosed for 
its use as a payment method.2 It is created electronically by ‘miners’ who use special-
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1 Philipp Hacker, Chris Thomale, Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Crypto-
currencies under EU Financial Law, 15 European Company and Financial Law Review 645-696 (2018). 
Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075820> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3075820>.
2 Financial Conduct Authority, Guidance on Cryptoassets, <https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/con 
sultation-papers/cp19-3-guidance-cryptoassets> (accessed 15 March 2019).
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ist mining software to solve complex mathematical equations, which then issue a set 
number of ‘coins’ in exchange. Cryptocurrency has been used as an alternative form 
of payment that does not follow traditional credit and debit card/cash systems. It has 
the potential to revolutionise industry and commerce. However, because cryptocur-
rency is an encrypted decentralised payment system, law enforcement agencies and 
governments do not have direct access to the data and information required for regu-
lation. The aim of this paper is to examine cryptocurrency in the crypto-finance eco-
system and to identify areas in which regulatory intervention is required. The paper 
has four parts. Part I focuses on the system and processes of cryptocurrency and 
identifies the features of this ‘decentralised’ system and the legal and regulatory 
implications. Part II discusses the perceived benefits of cryptocurrency to determine 
whether they fit with regulatory objectives and contribute to the rise of cryptocur-
rency. Part III discusses the fall of cryptocurrency and some associated factors, par-
ticularly lack of governance. Part IV discusses the need for regulation and governance.
I. Systems and Processes of Cryptocurrency
1.1. Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) Causing Decentralisation and 
Disintermediation 
Cryptocurrency is a type of cryptoasset and a payment method embedded on block-
chain.3 Blockchain is an algorithmic technology and a type of Distributed Ledger 
Technology (DLT), best known for being the underlying technology of cryptoassets.4 
Cryptocurrency based on blockchain claims to be able to remove the need for a trusted 
third party, such as a bank or government.5 It is a database of information that is spread 
throughout a network (decentralisation) and protected against falsification or modi-
fication (immutability).6 Transactions that occur on the network are recorded and are 
tamper-proofed or tamper-recorded. To be a strong DLT, the ledger must be able to 
handle transactions quickly, give participants access to the ledger, timestamp transac-
tions in the order they occurred, and rely on a consensus method to avoid compromis-
ing data.7 The aim of blockchain technology is to enable a system where participants 
can create, transact and record their financial activities.
3 O Cann, These are the Top 10 Emerging Technologies of 2016, <https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2016/06/top-10-emerging-technologies-2016/> (accessed 15 March 2019); K Panetta, Gartner’s 
Top 10 Strategic Technology Trends for 2017, <https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartners-
top-10-technology-trends-2017/> (accessed 15 March 2019).
4 UK Government Office for Science, Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Blockchain (2016).
5 Merlinda Andoni et al., Blockchain Technology IN THE Energy Sector: A Systematic Review of 
Challenges and Opportunities 100 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 145 (2019).
6 Advait Deshpande, Katherine Stewart, Louise Lepetit & Salil Gunashekar, Distributed Ledger 
Technologies/Blockchain: Challenges, Opportunities and the Prospects for Standards, British Standards 
Institution 1 (2017).
7 Gary Lilienthal, Nehaluddin Ahmad, Bitcoin: Is It Really Coinage? 24(3) Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 49-56 (2018).
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1.2. Nodes	and	Consensus	Rules
Blockchain is a shared database. The transactional history is contained in blocks that 
are “chained” together, and transactions are verified and validated by users in the 
network through a process known as ‘mining’. The actors in the network – the nodes 
– execute a common protocol (software), which is a set of rules or procedures for 
transmitting data between electronic devices.8 It is therefore necessary for the software 
that executes the protocol to operate according to identical and synchronised rules 
across the network.9 For Bitcoin, a type of cryptocurrency, the transaction protocol, 
or consensus rule, requires transactions to be in the correct data format, and with the 
correct signatures for the Bitcoins to be spent. As a result, a transaction output cannot 
be double-spent within a single blockchain.10 If one of the network nodes fails to 
respect the consensus rules and rejects an existing block with a specific transaction, 
it is denied access the system’s user base and transactional traffic.11 The consensus 
rules were devised to ensure the robustness of Bitcoin and to avoid the network being 
attacked by malicious nodes.12 However, the number of coins created by the protocols 
is not revealed, nor is the way the coins can be claimed through the ‘mining’ process, 
or what happened after all the coins have been claimed through this ‘mining’ process.13 
Because the mining nodes are not identified, and the way the consensus rules operate 
to ensure stability is not made clear, the undefined consensus rules have led to so-
called ‘forks’ that pose a major risk to financial stability.
1.3. Soft and Hard Forks as a Major Risk to Financial Stability 
Soft and hard14 forks in the cryptocurrency represent a major risk to financial stabil-
ity and consumer protection. A soft fork is a modification of the blockchain protocol 
that is compatible with the older version of the blockchain.15 In this case, the old 
validated blocks remain compatible with the new and stricter rules. Miners and nodes 
8 Sara Sánchez Fernández, ICOs and Investor Protection: A Cross-Border Perspective 34(3) Journal 
of International Banking Law and Regulation 95-96 (2019).
9 Gianluca Salviotti, Leonardo Maria De Rossi, Nico Abbatemarco, A Structured Framework to 
Assess the Business Application Landscape of Blockchain Technologies, 3469 (2018).
10 Andreas M Antonopoulos, Mining and Consensus in Mastering Bitcoin: Unlocking Digital 
Crypto-Currencies (O’Reilly, 2014).
11 Olivier Hari, Ulysse Pasquier, Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT): Academic 
Overview of the Technical and Legal Framework and Challenges For Lawyers 5 International Business 
Law Journal 423, 447 (2018).
12 Rui Zhang, Rui Xue, Ling Liu, Security and Privacy on Blockchain 1 ACM Comput. Surv. (2019).
13 Robby Houben, Alexander Snyers, Study Requested by the TAX3 Committee: Cryptocurrencies 
and Blockchain – Legal Context and Implications for Financial Crime, Money Laundering and Tax 
Evasion (2018). Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20
on%20cryptocurrencies%20and%20blockchain.pdf> 
14 Jeffery Atik, George Gerro, Hard Forks on the Bitcoin Blockchain: Reversible Exit, Continuing 
Voice 1 Stanford Journal of Blockchain Law & Policy 29 (2018).
15 Henri Arslanian, Fabrice Fischer, The Future of Finance: The Impact of FinTech, AI, and Crypto 
on Financial Services (Springer, 2019).
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do not need to join the upgraded version of the blockchain to get access to the system’s 
user base and transactional traffic.16 A hard fork is a major modification of the pro-
tocol that can revise any aspect of the code and whose new rules are not compatible 
with previous ones.17 Given the protocol’s distributed nature, such modification must 
be incorporated into the software code held individually by each node. To ensure the 
effectiveness of the hard fork, a majority of nodes must adopt it. If some of the min-
ers and nodes refuse the update, then two blockchains will exist in parallel, resulting 
in two different cryptocurrencies.18 The newly-created branch keeps the same blocks 
as the main blockchain prior to the hard fork, but will then create its own separate 
block history.19 Thus, each person who had owned cryptocurrency before the hard 
fork, will have the same amount in the new updated cryptocurrency.20 Well-known 
hard forks include Bitcoin Cash (BCH), from Bitcoin, or Ethereum Classic (ETC), 
from Ethereum.21 Consumers who purchase the coins may not appreciate the risks of 
forks, nor know how to update the software protocols in order to safeguard their coins. 
1.4. Three	Main	Categories	of	Blockchain	and	Regulatory	and	Legal	Implications	
1.4.1. Public	Blockchains
A public blockchain is an exchange network that is controlled by all the nodes (the 
participants) on a peer-to-peer basis.22 There is no barrier to participating in the net-
work or to making transactions. Joining the network simply involves downloading 
software that respects the blockchain protocols.23 This software is called a ‘network 
16 Bruno Biais, Christophe Bisière, Matthieu Bouvard, Catherine Casamatta, The Blockchain Folk 
Theorem (TSE Working Papers, 2018).
17 A Zamyatin, N Stifter, A Judmayer, P Schindler, E Weippl & WJ Knottenbelt, A Wild Velvet Fork 
Appears! Inclusive Blockchain Protocol Changes in Practice (London: Imperial College, Austria: SBA 
Research, 2018).
18 Jean Bacon, Johan David Michels, Christopher Millard & Jatinder Singh, Blockchain	Demystified:	
A Technical and Legal Introduction to Distributed and Centralised Ledgers 25(1) Rich. J.L. & Tech. 
(2018).
19 Christopher Natoli, Jiangshan Yu, Vincent Gramoli, Paulo Esteves-Verissimo, Deconstructing 
Blockchains: A Comprehensive Survey on Consensus, Membership and Structure, arXiv:1908.08316, 
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.08316.pdf> (accessed 30 August 2019).
20 Robby Houben, Alexander Snyers, Study Requested by the TAX3 Committee: Cryptocurrencies 
and Blockchain – Legal Context and Implications for Financial Crime, Money Laundering and Tax 
Evasion (2018). Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20
on%20cryptocurrencies%20and%20blockchain.pdf>.
21 Lawrence J Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies, and the Struggle of Law and Regulation to 
Keep Pace 102 Marquette Law Review 496 (2018); Danhui Xu, Free Money, But Not Tax-Free: A 
Proposal for the Tax Treatment of Cryptocurrency Hard Forks 87 Fordham Law Review 2698 (2018); 
AKM Najmul Islam, Matti Mäntymäki, Marja Turunen, Why do Blockchains Split? An Actor-Network 
Perspective on Bitcoin Splits 148 Technological Forecasting and Social Change (2019).
22 Dominique Guegan, The Digital World: II – Alternatives to the Bitcoin Blockchain ? 16 Documents 
de Travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2 (2018); Dominique Guegan, Public Blockchain 
versus Private Blockchain 20 Documents de Travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 3-4 (2017).
23 Richard Caetano, Learning Bitcoin (Packt Publishing Ltd, 30 October 2015). 
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client’, and it enables nodes to synchronise automatically and to interact with others 
using a compatible ‘network client’.24 All nodes are thus in an equivalent anonymous 
situation in regard to their participation in the network; this is the case for the Bitcoin 
and Ethereum blockchains.25 Using a public chain to distribute cryptoassets makes 
classification of their legal status a difficult task. In addition, the creators and issuers 
of the cryptoassets may be anonymous, hence ascertaining the purpose of the cryp-
toassets issued would be difficult. Clear classification of cryptoassets is required to 
determine who the regulators are, which regulations apply, and what kind of tax 
applies to gains made from mining or selling cryptoassets. A cryptoasset could poten-
tially be e-money (such as Libra), currency (state-backed currency), a means of 
exchange, a security, a commodity, or a financial derivative.26
In the UK, exchange tokens such as Bitcoin on a public chain are not considered 
to be a currency or money, following the previous conclusions of both the Bank of 
England27 and the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors.28 They are 
neither a reliable store of value due to their high volatility, nor are they widely 
accepted as a means of exchange or used as units of account. In the UK, fewer than 
600 merchants are said to accept exchange tokens as a payment tool.29 The transfer-
ring, buying and selling of exchange tokens such as Bitcoins or Ethers, including the 
commercial operation of cryptoasset exchanges for these tokens, currently fall outside 
the regulatory perimeter. However, the Fifth Money Laundering Directive (5AMLD)30 
that was transposed into UK law in 2019 extends regulation against money launder-
ing and the financing of terrorism31 to entities carrying out exchange between cryp-
toassets and fiat currencies. It also regulates exchange between one or more forms of 
cryptoassets, transfer of cryptoassets, safekeeping or administration of cryptoassets 
24 World Bank Group, Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and Blockchain, <http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/177911513714062215/pdf/122140-WP-PUBLIC-DistributedLedger-Tech 
nology-and-Blockchain-Fintech-Notes.pdf> (accessed 17 March 2019).
25 Dominique Guegan, The Digital World: II – Alternatives to the Bitcoin Blockchain ?,16 Docu-
ments de Travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2 (2018); Dominique Guegan, Public Blockchain 
versus Private Blockchain 20 Documents de Travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 3-4 (2017).
26 A Blandin, AS Cloots, H Hussain, M Rauchs, R Saleuddin, JG Allen, et al., Global Cryptoasset 
Regulatory Landscape Study (Cambridge: Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, 2019); FS Board – 
Basel: Financial Stability Board, Crypto-asset Markets Potential Channels for Future Financial Stability 
Implications (2018); FCA, PS 19/22: Guidance on Cryptoassets Feedback and Final Guidance to CP 
19/3 (2019).
27 Bank of England, The Future of Money – speech by Mark Carney, <https://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/speech/2018/mark-carney-speech-to-the-inaugural-scottish-economics-conference> (accessed 17 
March 2019).
28 G20, Communiqué – Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, <https://www.mof.go.jp/
english/international_policy/convention/g20/20180722.htm (accessed 17 March 2019).
29 FCA, CP 19/3: Guidance on Cryptoassets 21 (2019). 
30 Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending 
Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money 
laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU.
31 FCA, CP 19/3: Guidance on Cryptoassets (2019). 
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or instruments enabling control over cryptoassets, or participation in and provision 
of financial services related to an issuer’s offer and/or sale of a cryptoasset.32 
In the Final Guidance published by the FCA in July 2019,33 it has been decided 
that the division between regulated and potentially unregulated tokens should be made 
clearer. Unregulated tokens are now referred to as fully or partly transferable tokens, 
decentralised or issued centrally, that give access to current or prospective goods or 
services in one or multiple networks and ecosystems, or which are used as a means 
of exchange.34 Activities related to security tokens would fall within the regulatory 
perimeter, and those related to utility tokens would be subject to EMRs if they are 
centralised, pegged to a currency or the digital representation of fiat money stored on 
an electronic chip.35 Furthermore, legally established issuers of such e-money have 
an obligation to redeem at any moment and at par value the monetary value of the 
e-money.36 Similarly, in France, cryptoassets are neither regarded as a currency nor 
considered a means of payment by the Banque de France.37 Tokens are described in 
the PACTE law as immaterial items, representing one or more rights in digital form 
that could be issued, compiled, kept and transferred through a digital shared instru-
ment, that allows indirect identification of the owner of the tokens.38 Bitcoin is defined 
as a ‘unit of account’, which renders both private and commercial cryptocurrency 
traders subject to taxation.39 The majority of countries across the EU do not recognise 
cryptoassets as a form of currency, except for the purposes of anti-money laundering 
and taxation.40 
1.4.2. Private	Blockchains
A private blockchain, in contrast, is a private network on which the ‘manager’ can 
modify the protocols and procedures for transmitting data between electronic devic-
es.41 Participation in the network requires the network owner’s permission. The par-
ticipants have certain rights, and decisions made on the blockchain are made by a 
majority vote.42 The organisation and operating conditions of a private chain are 
addressed in Terms and Conditions where the parties define the roles of the technol-
32 Ibid.




37 Banque de France, Les dangers liés au développement des monnaies virtuelles : l’exemple du 
Bitcoin (The Dangers of the Development of Virtual Currencies: The Bitcoin Example), <https://
publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/focus-10_2013-12-05_fr.pdf> 
(accessed 18 March 2019).
38 PACTE Law no. 2019-486 (22 May 2019), art. 26.
39 Ibid.
40 A Blandin et al., Global Cryptoasset Regulatory Landscape Study (Cambridge: Cambridge Centre 
for Alternative Finance, 2019).
41 Karl Wüst, Arthur Gervais, Do You Need a Blockchain? (Zurich: ETH, London: Imperial College, 
2018).
42 Ibid.
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ogy provider and users. The Swift system is an example of such a chain. It is becom-
ing common in private blockchains for the operator in charge to be officially appointed 
in charge of the technical platforms that support blockchain.43
1.5. Systems	and	Processes	of	Bitcoin	and	Its	Non-Transparency	
Bitcoin is based on a public blockchain that is usable by anybody and is not owned 
or controlled by an entity.44 All transactions are verified and added to the public ledger 
through the ‘mining’ process, which is also the process through which new Bitcoin 
units are emitted.45 Bitcoins are created in the protocol, but mining nodes can claim 
their ownership by solving maths questions.46 Ownership of bitcoin is established 
through digital keys, bitcoin addresses, and digital signatures.47 The digital keys are 
created and stored by users in a database called a wallet. These keys are completely 
independent of the bitcoin protocol and can be generated and managed by the user’s 
wallet software on its own, even offline.48 Mining nodes are responsible for solving 
complicated mathematical puzzles that are part of the Bitcoin programme, the so-
called ‘proof of work’.49 However, there are rules governing the operations of mining 
nodes and the designer of the mathematical puzzles is not public knowledge. As Bit-
coin mining is essentially guesswork and is highly competitive, being the first miner 
to find the correct answer in a profitable way requires the most up-to-date hardware 
and/or membership in a group of miners who can combine their computing power.50 
Mining nodes, acting as such central authorities, record and verify transactions in a 
permissionless public ledger.51 This can create an unfair situation where those who 
possess high computing power are able to claim ownership of newly revealed coins 
and, potentially control the whole network. The task of calculating the hashes and 
mining blocks is made difficult in order to ensure that the rate at which new blocks 
are created remains constant, as well as to prevent the devaluation of the cryptocur-
43 Vitalik Buterin, On Public and Private Blockchains, <https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/
on-public-and-private-blockchains/> (accessed 18 March 2019). See also Jean Bacon, Johan David 
Michels, Christopher Millard & Jatinder Singh, Blockchain	 Demystified:	 A	 Technical	 and	 Legal	
Introduction to Distributed and Centralised Ledgers 25(1) Rich. J.L. & Tech. (2018).
44 Marcella Atzori, Blockchain Technology and Decentralized Governance: Is the State Still 
Necessary?, Journal of Governance and Regulation 7 (2017).
45 Dominique Guegan, Public Blockchain versus Private Blockchain 20 Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 3 (2017).
46 Ibid.
47 Andreas M Antonopoulos, Keys, Addresses in Mastering Bitcoin: Unlocking Digital Crypto-
Currencies (O’Reilly, 2014).
48 Ibid.
49 Michael Crosby et al., Blockchain Technology Beyond Bitcoin, Sutardja Center for Entrepreneurship 
& Technology Technical Report 10 (2015).
50 Merlinda Andoni et al., Blockchain Technology in the Energy Sector: A Systematic Review of 
Challenges and Opportunities 100 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 146 (2019).
51 See National Institute of Standards and Technology, Draft NISTIR 8202 Blockchain Technology 
Overview (2018).
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rency.52 Another way to achieve this aim is to fix a maximum supply of units that can 
be generated through mining into the blockchain algorithm.53 When all coins have 
been claimed, will the mining function stop or continue? It is argued that mining fees 
will need to be increased in order to incentivize miners to continue their crucial work 
of maintaining the network and verifying transactions. While the increased fee struc-
ture makes sense if Bitcoin continues its success as a speculative commodity and a 
store of value, the issue of fees should be approached very carefully if Bitcoin is to 
replace or compete with fiat currency.




It has been claimed that cryptoassets stored in an offline wallet are as difficult for 
other people to access as a wallet of cash, the only weak point being the user’s own 
capacity to remember their private key.54 They cannot be counterfeited or reversed 
arbitrarily by the sender, as is the case with credit card charge-backs.55 Cryptocurrency 
uses a distributed public ledger to record transactions so that there is no private data-
base owned and controlled by a third party; instead, there is a public transaction 
database in which the personal identity of each cryptocurrency owner is hidden. As 
a result, fraud is almost impossible if the cryptocurrency is set up properly because 
various nodes tracking the ledger must validate the transaction.56 This is a fundamen-
tal difference from payment networks such as Alipay, WeChat or Apple Pay, which 
are still tied to the banking system.
2.1.2. Privacy
In a credit card operation, the merchant initiates the payment and obtains access to a 
customer’s full credit line, even if the transaction is a small one.57 This is the so-called 
“pull” mechanism, which means funds are pulled from a third party, such as a bank 
or a credit card company.58 To use a credit card online, one only needs the card num-
ber, the cardholder’s name, the CCV number, and the expiration date. This personal 
information is repeatedly shared with online retailers who are vulnerable to hacks. In 
52 Ghassan O Karame, Elli Androulaki, Bitcoin and Blockchain Security (Artech House, 2016).
53 Ibid.
54 House of Commons, Crypto-assets, Twenty-Second Report of Session 2017-19 (2018). 
55 Arti Sharma, Ayush Anand, Digital Currency and its Risk 83 International Journal of Creative 
Research Thoughts 554 (2018).
56 Jennifer J Xu, Are Blockchains Immune to All Malicious Attacks? 2 Financial Innovation 25 
(2016), <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40854-016-0046-5 (accessed 19 March 2019).
57 Deloitte, Real-time Payments Are Changing the Reality of Payments (2015). 
58 Ibid.
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the cryptocurrency world, on the other hand, the cryptocurrency holder sends the 
amount to the recipient or merchant without giving any further identity information.59 
Bitcoin payments are similar to wire transfers or cash transactions, where payment is 
“pushed” directly from one party to another, without going through another financial 
institution, hence the name “push” mechanism.60 However, with Bitcoin, one can have 
the same level of privacy as a cash transaction while being able to trace it on the 
blockchain.
2.1.3. Cutting	Out	the	Middleman
The cryptocurrency blockchain simplifies the settlement process in real property 
purchases.61 As the cryptocurrency blockchain is a large property rights database, 
digital currency can be used to execute and enforce two-party contracts on real prop-
erty.62 In this way, transactions using cryptocurrency as a payment method can cut 
out the middleman and thus help eliminate expensive brokerage and legal fees while 
enabling the completion of a contract at a future time.63 Since cryptocurrencies are 
accessible to anyone with access to the Internet or to a mobile phone, approximately 
1.7 billion individuals in the developing world who are currently excluded from tra-
ditional exchange systems could benefit from such a system.64 Cryptocurrencies are 
designed for low-cost and no-fee transactions, even if most users use a third-party 
service, such as Coinbase, which charges fees for creating and maintaining their own 
Bitcoin wallets.65 This service is similar to PayPal, an online intermediary payment 
service that facilitates peer-to-peer payment systems. However, one major benefit of 
cryptocurrencies is that their owners are free to engage a third party because they do 
not need to depend on a centralised entity to facilitate the transaction.66 In principle, 
cryptocurrency owners are not subject to third-party terms of service.
59 Susanne Chishti, Tony Craddock, Robert Courtneidge, Markos Zachariadis, The PayTech Book: 
The Payment Technology Handbook for Investors, Entrepreneurs, and FinTech Visionaries (John Wiley 
& Sons, 2020); see also Tatjana Boshkov, Blockchain and Digital Currency in the World of Finance, 
IntechOpen 30 (2018).
60 David Birch, Before Babylon, Beyond Bitcoin: From Money that We Understand to Money that 
Understands Us (Do Sustainability, 15 June 2017). 
61 J Michael Graglia, Christopher Mellon, Blockchain and Property in 2018: At the End of the 
Beginning (2018). 
62 Tatjana Boshkov, Blockchain and Digital Currency in the World of Finance, IntechOpen 30 
(2018).
63 Robby Houben, Alexander Snyers, Study Requested by the TAX3 Committee: Cryptocurrencies 
and Blockchain – Legal Context and Implications for Financial Crime, Money Laundering and Tax 
Evasion (2018). Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20
on%20cryptocurrencies%20and%20blockchain.pdf>.
64 Marco Lichtfous, Vivek Yadav, Valentina Fratino, Can Blockchain Accelerate Financial Inclusion 
Globally? (2018). 
65 Rainer Böhme, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman, Tyler Moore, Bitcoin: Economics, 
Technology, and Governance 29(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 225 (2015).
66 Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn, Bitcoin and Beyond: Cryptocurrencies, Blockchains, and Global 
Governance (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2018).
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2.2. The	Media	Hype	of	Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrency has been the subject of considerable attention in the media in recent 
years for several reasons, the main one related to Bitcoin. Before Bitcoin came to the 
market, there were attempts at creating online currencies with ledgers secured by 
encryption; examples include B-Money and Bit Gold.67 However, these attempts were 
never fully developed, largely because of the recurrent double-spending problem, a 
risk associated with any decentralised digital currency that can be spent twice.68 In 
2008, the global financial crisis occurred and almost led to the collapse of the world 
banking system. Consequently, investors lost confidence in mainstream financial 
markets and began to look for ways to protect their wealth and to diversify their port-
folios.69 In the same year, the first blockchain was conceptualised by an unknown 
person or group known as Satoshi Nakamoto, in a white paper entitled ‘Bitcoin – A 
Peer to Peer Electronic Cash System’.70 This white paper describes in detail a decen-
tralised and secure system that is governed by its own consensus rules without an 
issuing authority.71 In 2009, the Bitcoin software was made available to the general 
public, and the first block of the Bitcoin blockchain was created through the ‘mining’ 
process.72 The Bitcoin protocol was revolutionary for virtual currency enthusiasts 
because it solved the double-spending problem.73 When, in 2010, the inaugural Bit-
coin sale occurred it enabled Bitcoin units to be assigned a monetary value for the 
first time. A computer engineer swapped 10,000 units for two pizzas.74 Bitcoin’s price 
began to rise as demand started to increase, while still remaining below $1 at that 
time.75 The chaotic global financial context, coupled with the progressive rise in the 
67 Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone Should Read, <https://
www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/a-short-history-of-Bitcoin-and-cryptocurrency-everyone-
should-read/#27069be03f27> (accessed 21 September 2019).
68 Kevin V Tu & Michael W Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin Age 
90 WLR 279 (2015).
69 Chairman Ben S Bernanke, Stabilizing the Financial Markets and the Economy, <https://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081015a.htm> (accessed 22 September 2019).
70 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin, A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, <https://Bitcoin.org/Bitcoin.
pdf> (accessed 22 September 2019); Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew 
Miller, Steven Goldfeder, Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies, A Comprehensive Introduction 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).
71 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin, A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, <https://Bitcoin.org/Bitcoin.
pdf> (accessed 22 September 2019).
72 Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone Should Read, <https://
www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/a-short-history-of-Bitcoin-and-cryptocurrency-everyone-
should-read/#27069be03f27> (accessed 21 September 2019).
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School of Engineering and Applied Science 2 (2013); J Brito & A Astillo, Bitcoin: A Primer for 
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value of Bitcoin units and the lack of regulation surrounding cryptocurrency trading 
began to attract speculative investors.76
Bitcoin mining was lucrative in the early days of Bitcoin, as network users could 
mine using only the calculation power of laptops and desktops.77 However, with the 
exponential growth in network size between 2010 and 2011, mining cartels began to 
emerge and costly hardware replaced the initial hardware.78 Until 28 November 2012, 
50 Bitcoin units were awarded per block mined.79 Subsequently, when block 210,000 
was reached, the reward was halved to 25 Bitcoin units, which remained profitable 
for miners because the price continued to rise and the energy needed to mine remained 
reasonable.80 Many people joined the Bitcoin network to participate in the mining 
race and attempt to make a profit from it. While Bitcoin and its concept increased in 
popularity with the power of social media and aggressive person-to-person interac-
tion, rival cryptocurrencies – sometimes known as ‘alt-coins’ – such as Namecoin 
and Litecoin emerged.81 These alternative cryptocurrencies generally aim at improv-
ing the original Bitcoin design by offering greater anonymity, speed or other advan-
tages.82 The price of one Bitcoin eventually reached $1,000 in 2013, before 
plummeting to approximately $300.83 Even though Bitcoin remained marginal, 
increasing numbers of websites and even businesses began to accept payments in 
Bitcoin.84 The vast majority of these were computer hardware sales sites, but accept-
ance gradually expanded.85 Executives at eBay also considered offering Bitcoin as a 
payment method on the platform.86 A university in Cyprus allowed the payment of 
registration fees in Bitcoin.87 
76 Shaen Corbet, Brian M Lucey, Andrew Urquhart & Larisa Yarovaya, Cryptocurrencies as a 
Financial Asset: A Systematic Analysis, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3143122 (accessed 27 September 
2019).
77 Tristan Greene, A Brief History of Bitcoin Mining Hardware, <https://thenextweb.com/
hardfork/2018/02/02/a-brief-history-of-Bitcoin-mining-hardware/> (accessed 27 November 2019).
78 Katalyse.io, What is the Bitcoin Hype All About?, <https://hackernoon.com/what-is-the-Bitcoin-
hype-all-about-1ae5f9251367> (accessed 27 November 2019).
79 Melvin Draupnir, What is the Bitcoin Mining Block Reward?, <https://www.Bitcoinmining.com/
what-is-the-Bitcoin-block-reward/> (accessed 28 November 2019).
80 Ibid.
81 RE Kadyrov, IV Prokhorov, Regulating Cryptocurrencies: New Challenges to Economic Security 
and Problems Created by Individuals Involved in the Schemes of Laundering Cryptocurrencies-
Generated	Profits, Moscow Engineering Physics Institute 2 (2018).
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9 IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance 39 (2018).
83 Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone Should Read, <https://
www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/a-short-history-of-Bitcoin-and-cryptocurrency-everyone-
should-read/#27069be03f27> (accessed 21 September 2019).
84 Rainer Böhme, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman, Tyler Moore, Bitcoin: Economics, 
Technology, and Governance 29(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 224 (2015).
85 Ibid.
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The publicity around this new technology was boosted in October 2015 by The 
Economist’s issue entitled ‘Blockchain, the Trust Machine’, which argued that block-
chain could transform the way the economy works.88 Psychological factors played an 
important role in this hype, and investors’ speculation89 led to a one-sided demand 
with a peak of inflated expectations. Expectations inflated when cryptocurrency inves-
tors boasted about their skyrocketing returns while ignoring negative factors, such as 
the lack of regulation, the extreme volatility of the market or the use of cryptocurren-
cies for illicit and criminal activities. Mainstream media coverage of Bitcoin also 
played a role in exaggerating its potential.90 Cryptocurrency had changed from a 
method of payment to a speculative investment and a tool for money laundering. 
III. Lack of Governance and the Fall of Cryptocurrencies: The Bitcoin 
Example
Prices of cryptocurrencies eventually crashed on 17 December 2017 when Bitcoin 
reached its peak price of $19,511.91 While it was anticipated that the bubble might 
burst, the price of Bitcoin did not fall to zero. The excessive interest in Bitcoin was 
characterised by speculative demand. Studying the way in which interest in Bitcoin 
has faded prompts a focus on those elements that may have caused a progressive 
disinterest or even mistrust by investors. First, as the media publicity surrounding 
cryptocurrencies increased, they started to become a target for hacks and frauds which 
goes against the claimed benefits of cryptocurrency-asset security. Speculative pres-
sure became a source of price volatility and posed a threat to blockchain development, 
while the use of cryptocurrencies for criminal and illicit activities seriously compro-
mised its reputation and rebutted the claim that the blockchain is transparent. Lack 
of regulation was a significant factor in associating Bitcoin with uncertainty and 
untrustworthiness and consequently challenged the credibility of the ‘consensus sys-
tem’ on blockchain. 
3.1. Cryptoassets,	a	Target	for	Hacks	and	Frauds
3.1.1. Risks	to	Value	Linked	to	the	Lack	of	Security	of	Exchanges
Cryptoasset exchanges are attractive targets for hackers because they are less difficult 
to hack than blockchain protocols and are less distributed than wallets.92 Any weak-
88 The Economist, Blockchain, The Trust Machine (2015).
89 Ibid.
90 Michal Polasik, Anna Piotrowska, Radoslaw Kotkowski, Tomasz Piotr Wisniewski, Price 
Fluctuations and the Use of Bitcoin: An Empirical Inquiry 20(1) International Journal of Electronic 
Commerce 9, 49 (2015).
91 Galina Hale, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Marianna Kudlyak, Patrick Shultz, How Futures Trading 
Changed Bitcoin Prices, <https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2018/
may/how-futures-trading-changed-Bitcoin-prices/> (accessed 7 October 2019).
92 Financial Inclusion Global Initiative – Security, Infrastructure and Trust Working Group, Security 
Aspects of Distributed Ledger Technologies (2019). 
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ness in design means that cryptocurrency exchange is vulnerable and which may 
provide a centralised failure point.93 Since 2017, hackers such as the infamous North 
Korean hacker crew dubbed “Lazarus” have exploited these flaws for huge gains 
amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.94 However, even if there is no such 
centralised failure point in the design of cryptoassets, it does not mean that their con-
sensus cannot be used by a malicious group of miners representing the majority of 
the network’s mining hash rate or computing power.95 In this case, the majority group 
could alter transaction history and prevent the validation of new transactions. More-
over, cryptocurrency exchanges do not benefit from the same protection as stock 
exchanges. While stock exchanges and cryptocurrency exchanges share the key func-
tion of acting as platforms on which assets are traded, cryptocurrency exchanges 
differ in that they hold investors’ assets in a common wallet that is usually connected 
to the Internet and not owned by investors.96 While the safe-keeping of assets is not 
a function undertaken by stock exchanges, this is not the case with cryptocurrency 
exchanges. Most cryptocurrency exchanges also offer safe-keeping of the private 
cryptographic keys of a large number of their users97 and a private key allows a user 
to unlock a specific address and to obtain control of the clients’ digital assets.98 If 
such a cryptocurrency exchange is hacked, then the hacker could copy the database 
of private keys, access all the specific addresses and immediately siphon out all the 
available funds.99 If most of the funds are stored in a ‘hot’ wallet that is connected to 
the Internet, a hacker who gains access to the wallet could easily steal the funds.100 
Furthermore, although stock exchanges are required to hold security insurance to 
cover the risk of loss, cryptocurrency exchanges are not.101 Only Coinbase and Gem-
ini offer security insurance on cash deposits.102 Thus, when assets are in a common 
93 Ibid.
94 Neil Mathew, $571 Million: Notorious North Korean Hacker Group Has Stolen a Fortune’, 
<https://www.ccn.com/571-million-notorious-north-korean-hacker-group-has-stolen-a-fortune-in-
cryptocurrency> (accessed 17 March 2019).
95 Hossein Nabilou, André Prüm, Ignorance, Debt, and Cryptocurrencies: The Old and the New in 
the Law and Economics of Concurrent Currencies 5(1) Journal of Financial Regulation 29, 63 (2019).
96 Dennis Chu, Broker-Dealers for Virtual Currency: Regulating Cryptocurrency Wallets and 
Exchanges 118(8) Columbia Law Review 2323, 2360 (2018).
97 Robby Houben, Alexander Snyers, Study Requested by the TAX3 Committee: Cryptocurrencies 
and Blockchain – Legal Context and Implications for Financial Crime, Money Laundering and Tax 
Evasion (2018). Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20
on%20cryptocurrencies%20and%20blockchain.pdf>
98 A Blandin et al., Global Cryptoasset Regulatory Landscape Study (Cambridge: Cambridge Centre 
for Alternative Finance, 2019). 
99 Ibid.
100 Paul Vigna, Michael J Casey, The Age of Cryptocurrency: How Bitcoin and Digital Money Are 
Challenging the Global Economic Order (St. Martin’s Publishing Group, 2015). 
101 House of Commons, Crypto-assets, Twenty-Second Report of Session 2017-19 (2018).
102 See Gemini’s User Agreement, Digital Asset Insurance, <https://gemini.com/legal/user-
agreement#digital-asset-insurance> (accessed 3 December 2019); Coinbase, How is Coinbase Insured?, 
<https://support.coinbase.com/customer/portal/articles/1662379-how-is-coinbase-insured-> (accessed 3 
December 2019).
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wallet, there is a high risk of theft.103 The best way for investors to protect their assets 
is to keep their digital tokens away from exchanges and to store them offline in ‘cold’ 
storage.104 This move is impractical for frequent traders who hold cryptocurrency 
across several exchanges. For exchanges which choose to keep most of their assets 
in offline storage wallets, they must ensure that there is more than one person respon-
sible for the wallets and their corresponding keys, or set up a back-door mechanism. 
To avoid the single point of failure, cryptocurrency exchanges should keep cryptoas-
sets in a cold wallet that is offline most of the time and require permission from mul-
tiple parties for any change in the wallet. This process is similar to the way the central 
securities depository operates. A smart contract that allows automatic disclosure of 
the cold wallet’s private key to a designated trustworthy person should also be coded, 
in order to prevent customers’ funds from being permanently lost.105 Cryptocurrency 
exchanges should also be subject to the requirements of securities trading venues and 
securities depositories to ensure market safety and investor protection. 
3.1.2. Value	Risks	Linked	to	Frauds
Cryptoassets, taken in a broader sense than cryptocurrency, have experienced very 
strong growth since the multiplication of exchange platforms. In 2013, the market 
was mainly based on 14 cryptoassets,106 but by 2019, there were nearly 1,500 in cir-
culation, 50% of which are simple tokens created on networks.107 However, this great 
expansion has been accompanied by an equivalent boom in fraud: more than 80% of 
ICOs (Initial Coin Offerings) conducted in 2017 were identified as frauds.108 An ICO 
is similar to a direct listing because the business sells tokenised securities or interests 
directly to the public without regulatory approval, underwriters or intermediaries. 
Since there is a widespread lack of understanding about blockchain technology, com-
bined with the system’s opacity, fear of missing gains, and uncontrolled social media 
hype, ICO fraudsters create fake crypto-coins and offer them to investors by promis-
ing unrealistic speculated targets and profit returns in their white papers.109 Such white 
papers usually contain inaccurate information or stolen content and do not give the 
details of the team behind the venture or provide a clear roadmap.110 In some instances, 
fraudsters do not even provide a white paper.
103 Patrick McCorry, Malte Möser, Syed Taha Ali, Why Preventing a Cryptocurrency Exchange 
Heist Isn’t Good Enough, Security Protocols Workshop 3 (2018).
104 European Securities and Markets Authority, Advice	–	Initial	Coin	Offerings	and	Crypto-Assets 
(2019); Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, ASIFMA Best Practices for Digital 
Asset Exchanges (2018).
105 Timothy G Massad, It’s Time to Strengthen the Regulation of Crypto-Assets (Economic Studies 
at Brookings, 2019).
106 Satis Group, Cryptoasset Market Coverage Initiation: Technical Underpinnings, <https://
research.bloomberg.com/pub/res/d2246jsnqusjYSeacPbQc2IjVIw> (accessed 3 October 2019).
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Paul Barnes, Cryptocurrency and its Susceptibility to Speculative Bubbles, Manipulation, Scams 
and Fraud, Munich Personal RePEc Archive 15, 17 (2018).
110 David Florysiak, Alexander Schandlbauer, The Information Content of ICO White Papers, 
European Financial Management Journal 7, 8 (2019).
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Those who attempt to defraud investors have also been known to develop coun-
terfeit smart contracts and target exchanges that appear to list their fake digital assets.111 
These counterfeit products appear with falsely high prices through volume generation 
by fraudsters. Prices then crash once the assets are sold to investors. The estimated 
amount lost from hacks and frauds between 2011 and 2018 was approximately $2.3 
billion USD, and most of these thefts occurred on exchanges, although some relate 
to offline storage wallets.112 These recurrent and significant hacks and thefts have 
begun to arouse mistrust and have increased investors’ concerns about the safety of 
ICOs, which has also had a negative impact on cryptocurrency growth. Despite the 
inherent uncertainty about ICOs and the general decline in the market, fundraising 
for crypto projects steadily increased in the early part of 2018.113 However, this growth 
only lasted until the end of the first half of 2018 before decreasing significantly in 
number and volume.114 This decrease can be explained by the progressive shift from 
ICOs to regulated STOs, and a global shift from quantity to quality.115 STOs are a 
more mature and regulated form of ICO as the underlying tokens provide different 
financial rights such as dividends and mainly focus on accredited investors by impos-
ing higher market entry barriers to comply with regulations.116 Regulated crypto-
markets can improve user confidence and prevent fraud. 
3.2. Speculative Pressure, a Source of Price Volatility and Danger for Blockchain 
Development
The main problem with cryptocurrency may still lie in price volatility and the fact 
that most Bitcoin owners consider it an investment currency.117 Many consumers see 
cryptoassets as a fast-track to easy wealth, without fully understanding what they are 
purchasing.118 Their behaviour is influenced by the advice of a few influential recom-
mendations rather than mainstream media or official sources of information.119 The 
increasing speculative pressure that investors have placed on cryptocurrency, often 
irrationally, may have acted to kill the innovative nature of blockchain development. 
When speculation results in volatile market conditions, it is difficult to experiment 
111 Christof Ferreira Torres, Mathis Steichen, Radu State, The Art of The Scam: Demystifying 
Honeypots in Ethereum Smart Contracts (2019). Available at: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.06976.pdf>. 
112 The New York Times Editorial Staff, Cryptocurrencies: Bitcoin, Blockchain and Beyond (The 
Rosen Publishing Group, Inc, 15 December 2018). 
113 Satis Group, Cryptoasset Market Coverage Initiation: Technical Underpinnings, <https://
research.bloomberg.com/pub/res/d2246jsnqusjYSeacPbQc2IjVIw> (accessed 3 October 2019).
114 Strategy& PwC, Crypto Valley, 4th ICO/STO Report – A Strategic Perspective (2019).
115 Ibid.
116 Michael Mendelson, From	Initial	Coin	Offerings	to	Security	Tokens:	A	U.S.	Federal	Securities	
Law Analysis 22(1) Stanford Technology Law Review 52 (2019).
117 Giancarlo Giudici, Alistair Milne, Dmitri Vinogradov, Cryptocurrencies: Market Analysis and 
Perspectives, Journal of Industrial and Business Economics 8 (2019).
118 FCA, Cryptoassets: Ownership and Attitudes in the UK – Consumer Survey Research Report 
(2019).
119 Ibid.
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with the technology to promote a more successful and secure use of cryptocurrency. 
The technology struggles to keep pace with developments.
It was argued that the fall of Bitcoin was directly linked to the launch of a futures 
market on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.120 Because there was no market for 
Bitcoin derivatives, it was extremely difficult to bet on the decline in Bitcoin prices, 
as such bets usually take the form of short selling.121 Thus, futures contracts gave 
institutional investors the ability to manipulate the crypto market and suppress the 
over-exaggeration of Bitcoin value to better align the asset with the business model 
of mainstream financial services. The FCA plans to make derivative contracts of 
cryptocurrency illegal and unenforceable in order to protect retail investors from high 
volatility and risks.122 By making these contracts legal, regulators would have given 
legitimacy to cryptocurrency, and allowed it to taint the safety of derivatives market. 
Furthermore, the gambling sentiment of the financial market should not be encour-
aged, as most consumers cannot reliably value derivatives based on unregulated 
cryptoassets.123 Finally, a derivative contract using cryptocurrency as a benchmark 
cannot currently be enforced. While it is essential to warn and support retail custom-
ers, a ban of derivatives contracts would currently be preferable for the reasons 
detailed above. Moreover, the market abuse regime should apply to cryptocurrency 
markets in order to enhance market integrity and investor protection.
3.3. Criminal	and	Illicit	Activities,	a	Reputation	Killer	for	Cryptocurrencies
Because of the initial lack of regulation of the crypto space, many commentators have 
portrayed Bitcoin as a medium for criminal and illicit activities.124 This response is 
largely due to the Silk Road website, which is an online market place on the dark web 
for buying and selling drugs, weapons and other illicit articles that uses Bitcoin as its 
main currency.125 Illicit buying and selling was simple for criminals, especially in 
2011, when the monetary value of a Bitcoin unit was 1$.126 Although this website 
contributed to the rising popularity of Bitcoin, at the same time, it tainted the reputa-
120 Neil Gandal, Hanna Halaburda, Working Paper: Competition in the Cryptocurrency Market, 33 
Bank of Canada Working Paper 15 (2014).
121 Galina Hale, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Marianna Kudlyak, Patrick Shultz, How Futures Trading 
Changed Bitcoin Prices, <https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2018/
may/how-futures-trading-changed-Bitcoin-prices/> (accessed 7 October 2019).
122 FCA, FCA Proposes Ban on Sale of Crypto-derivatives to Retail Consumers, <https://www.
fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-proposes-ban-sale-crypto-derivatives-retail-consumers> (accessed 19 
November 2019).
123 Ibid.
124 Samantha Douma, Bitcoin: The Pros and Cons of Regulation, Universiteit Leiden 13 (2016); 
Joe Mont, Very Real Regulations Issued on Virtual Currencies 10 (112) Compliance Week (2013).
125 Joseph Cox, Chapter 4 – Staying in the Shadows: The Use of Bitcoin and Encryption in 
Cryptomarkets in European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, The Internet and Drug 
Markets: Insight, 21 (Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2016). 
126 Rainer Böhme, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman, Tyler Moore, Bitcoin: Economics, 
Technology, and Governance 29(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 222 (2015).
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tion of cryptocurrency, even after the website had been shut down by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the criminals convicted by the US Federal Court 
in Manhattan.127 As cryptoassets such as Bitcoin are in essence digital and there is no 
physical location linked to a cryptocurrency wallet, they quickly became the favour-
ite payment method for cyber-criminals using Ransomware.128 Various studies and 
official sources show that the use of cryptoassets for illicit activities is small compared 
to the use of fiat. The most recent instance concerned Denmark’s biggest bank, whose 
CEO had to resign following a $235 billion USD money laundering scandal.129 Fur-
thermore, using Bitcoin does not make criminals’ transactions untraceable because 
the veil of anonymity on blockchain is potentially breakable, whereas cash is often 
traceless.130 However, the money laundering regime needs to apply to activities related 
to cryptocurrencies, both on public or private chains, in order to prevent financial 
market from being tainted with criminal activities. Cryptocurrency exchanges ought 
to be required to conduct ‘Know-your-customer’ processes. 
3.4. Lack	of	Regulation,	a	Cause	of	Uncertainty	and	Untrustworthiness
Discussions about blockchain are dominated by its applications in finance and busi-
ness. It is perceived mostly as a threat to the current system, and it suffers from a 
consequent lack of trust.131 In 2018, at least 60% of Americans, Europeans and Aus-
tralians were aware of cryptoassets, but only 8% and 9% of Europeans owned cryp-
tocurrency.132 Regulatory interventions have an impact not only on the price of 
cryptoassets but also on blockchain success.133 The uncertain relationship between 
blockchain and law leads to scepticism and confusion. Some critics also see this tech-
nology as a haven for criminal activity and a way to avoid legal accountability.134 This 
scepticism led Chinese regulators to shut down several Bitcoin exchanges and ban 
ICOs in 2017, causing a Bitcoin price drop of 29% in 24 hours.135 The lack of regula-
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Will Martin, The CEO of Denmark’s Biggest Bank is out after a $235 Billion Money-Laundering 
Scandal, <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/danske-bank-ceo-resigns-estonian-money-laundering-
scandal-2018-9#2MyHdee8KaPPx72k.99> (accessed 11 October 2019).
130 Franscica Moreno, Shivangee Trivedi, Staying Anonymous on the Blockchain: Concerns and 
Techniques, <https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/staying-anonymous-on-the-blockchain-
concerns-and-techniques/> (accessed 11 October 2019).
131 Peter D De Vries, An Analysis of Cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, and the Future 1(2) International 
Journal of Business Management and Commerce 6 (2016).
132 ING, International Survey – Mobile Banking 2018 – Cryptocurrency, <https://www.ezonomics.
com/ing_international_surveys/mobile-banking-2018-cryptocurrency/> (accessed 17 October 2019).
133 Raphael Auer, Stijn Claessens, Regulating Cryptocurrencies: Assessing Market Reactions, BIS 
Quarterly Review 55 (2018).
134 Kevin Werbrach, Trust, But Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law 33 Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal 489 (2018).
135 Rishi Iyengar, China’s Bitcoin Crackdown Forces Exchanges to Close. The price is crashing, 
<https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/15/technology/china-Bitcoin-exchanges-prices-crash/index.html> 
(accessed 14 October 2019); Alicia Cameron, Kelly Trinh, Four Factors Driving the Price of Bitcoin, 
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tion has also prevented compliant ICO projects from working.136 Japan has recognised 
Bitcoin as a legal tender, enabling Bitcoin to be used as an official form of payment 
to pay a public or private debt or meet a financial obligation.137 Such legal recognition 
pushed Bitcoin prices up by 2% in 24 hours and increased the price globally by 160% 
for the next two months.138 In the US, August 2018 was marked by the decision of 
the US Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) to reject no less than nine propos-
als for Exchange-Traded Funds that are indexed on Bitcoin.139 The SEC announced 
the rejection of 9 ETF projects from three different issuers, Direxion, GraniteShares 
and ProShares140 for lack of assurances concerning product safety, in particular the 
risk of fraud and manipulation.141
Computer programmes using various indicators to recognise trends and automati-
cally execute trades to manipulate the price of Bitcoin are not new.142 Market manip-
ulation creates unstable market conditions and artificially inflated volumes across 
exchanges.143 Algorithm traders or major traders usually use three techniques to 
manipulate a regulated market: pump and dump,144 order spoofing145 or wash trading.146 
Although this problem continues to be subject to frequent regulatory review, the SEC 
was called to reconsider its rules, regulations, and guidelines so as to ensure that they 
are still working as intended to accomplish the SEC’s mission.147 Risk management 
strategies and the ways in which crypto trading platforms fulfil customer responsi-
<http://theconversation.com/four-factors-driving-the-price-of-Bitcoin-87244> (accessed 5 October 
2019).
136 Alfred Ruoxi Zhang et al., The	Regulation	Paradox	of	Initial	Coin	Offerings:	A	Case	Study	Ap	-
proach 2(2) Policy and Practice Reviews (2019).
137 Marta Gonzalez, Blockchain in Japan (EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation, 2018).
138 Ibid. at 31.
139 Ana Alexandre, US SEC to Review Rejection of Nine Bitcoin ETF Applications, <https://
cointelegraph.com/news/us-sec-to-review-rejection-of-nine-Bitcoin-etf-applications> (accessed 14 
October 2019).
140 See, for instance, Securities and Exchange Commission, Self-Regulatory Organizations; 
NYSE Arca, Inc.; Order Disapproving a Proposed Rule Change to List and Trade the Shares of 
the ProShares Bitcoin ETF and the ProShares Short Bitcoin ETF, <https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/
nysearca/2018/34-83904.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2019).
141 Ibid.
142 Matthew Hougan, Hong Kim, Micah Lerner, Economic and Non-Economic Trading in Bitcoin: 
Exploring the Real Spot Market For The World’s First Digital Commodity (SEC, 2019).
143 Ibid. at 33-34.
144 A group of investors buy huge quantities of a cryptocurrency to artificially inflate the course, 
hoping to create around this speculative bubble a feeling of a “fear of missing out”. When the goal is 
achieved, i.e., when the operation manages to attract enough new buyers to artificially raise the price, 
the actor who until now played the role of “pumper” then suddenly becomes a “dumper” and sells its 
assets before the others to obtain maximum benefits.
145 An individual creates fake purchase orders with no real intention to act in order to create an 
illusion about the market’s health.
146 A trader or group of traders buys and sells its own orders on a particular asset to increase the 
trading volume and create a false and exaggerated interest in this asset.
147 Elad Roisman, Statement	at	the	Senate	Committee	on	Banking,	Housing,	and	Urban	Affairs (24 
July 2018).
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bilities vary greatly.148 Potential conflicts of interest, a lack of initiatives to tackle 
market manipulation and abusive trading, and insufficient protection for customers’ 
funds were also identified as major concerns.149 Finally, retail investors are the most 
disadvantaged by the business model of exchanges or the types of products and ser-
vices developed in crypto trading.150 The business model of exchanges consists in the 
maker-taker fee model which encourages market liquidity by rewarding the makers, 
whose orders exist on the order book prior to the trade, with a fee discount.151 By 
contrast, the takers, whose orders match the makers’ ones, pay a higher fee for remov-
ing the liquidity created by makers.152
Regulatory concerns, as well as the closing of technological and financial channels 
by private institutions,153 are commonly presented as causes of the cryptocurrency 
downturn. The market has been highly sensitive to any news coming from the finan-
cial sector or regulators since the start of 2018, whether true or false. It is submitted 
that cryptocurrency trading platforms should act as a gatekeeper against market 
manipulation to protect the users and the investors, as well as the cryptocurrency 
market’s integrity.
IV. The Need for Regulation and Governance and a Possible Approach
Cryptoassets suffer from a lack of trust. This trust could be brought back by regula-
tion, but approaches taken by regulators to date are diverse and sometimes even 
contradictory, which is particularly obvious in the crucial issue of the categorisation 
of cryptoassets.
4.1. Regulation,	a	Potential	Solution	to	the	Lack	of	Trust	in	Cryptoassets
This section will first discuss the rationale for a legal and regulatory framework as a 
necessary path to providing confidence and then identify major terminology problems 
in governing a constantly evolving technology. Finally, the substantial problems 
associated with trying out new methods of regulation in a dispersed architecture will 
be examined.
148 Barbara D Underwood, Virtual Markets Integrity Initiative – Report, <https://ag.ny.gov/sites/
default/files/vmii_report.pdf?mod=article_inline> (accessed 9 December 2019).
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Stanislav Dolgopolov, Linking the Securities Market Structure and Capital Formation: Incentives 
for Market Makers? 16(1) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 37 (2013).
152 Ibid. at 38.
153 Alice Woodhouse, Bitcoin Drops on Report Goldman Sachs Shelves Trading Desk Plans, 
<https://www.ft.com/content/59a16554-b16e-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c> (accessed 16 October 2019); 
Duncan Riley, Bitcoin Price Drops as Major Banks Ban Cryptocurrency Credit Card Purchases, 
<https://siliconangle.com/2018/02/04/Bitcoin-price-drops-major-banks-ban-cryptocurrency-credit-card-
purchases/> (accessed 17 October 2019).
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4.1.1. The	Risky	but	Necessary	Path	Towards	a	Legal	and	Regulatory	Framework
Regulation may seem to be an unwanted element in the development of the decen-
tralised Bitcoin community154 but it is necessary if cryptocurrency is to grow and 
become more widely accepted. Smart regulation and taxation are expected to add 
legitimacy, to spur investment by big players and to bring Bitcoin into conformity 
with existing monetary systems.155 The risk of hasty regulation is that it might hinder 
innovation or stifle blockchain development at an early stage solely for purposes of 
public policy.156 Countries such as the UK, the US, Japan, and China currently rec-
ognise the value of distributed ledger technology, and their regulations are mostly 
focused on cryptoassets and ICOs. Their emphasis is on crypto money laundering, 
tax evasion, and consumer protection from financial fraud and market manipulation.157 
However, it is suggested that consumer protection law should not only apply to the 
cases of financial fraud and market manipulation, but also to consumer contracts in 
which cryptoassets have been used as a means of payment. For instance, sale of goods 
contracts should be protected by the implied terms and remedies under the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 if cryptocurrency is used to pay for the goods.158 Consumers should 
be warned about the associated risks before contracting, and if a merchant fails to 
deliver the goods, the consumer should be entitled to compensation in fiat currency. 
The decision to regulate applications of the technology rather than the technology 
itself seems preferable to foster its development. Light-handed regulation of block-
chain that is neutral with regard to the different techniques used is the best way to 
encourage future development.159
4.1.2. Terminology	Problems	in	Governing	a	Constantly	Evolving	Technology
Global regulators face difficulties in understanding and adequately governing block-
chain due to the rapid evolution of the cryptocurrency space and the inconsistent 
154 Samantha Douma, Bitcoin: The Pros and Cons of Regulation, Leiden University Repository 30 
(2016).
155 Ibid. at 39.
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Blockchain Policy Forum Summary Report, <https://www.oecd.org/finance/2019-OECD-Global-
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Evasion (2018). Available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150761/TAX3%20Study%20
on%20cryptocurrencies%20and%20blockchain.pdf>.
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(2019). Available at: <https://35z8e83m1ih83drye280o9d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/6.6056_JO_Cryptocurrencies_Statement_FINAL_WEB_111119-1.pdf> <https://
technation.io/about-us/lawtech-panel/> (accessed 20 January 2020); Miklós Király, The Vienna Conven-
tion on International Sales of Goods and the Bitcoin 16 (5) US-China Law Review 179 (2018); Neil 
Tiwari,	The	Commodification	of	Cryptocurrency	117 (3) Michigan Law Review 611 (2018).
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terminology relating to the technology.160 This problem is a recurrent one in any field 
where technology or practice is actively developing.161 The language evolves quickly 
for both substantive and non-substantive reasons, which makes it difficult 
for regulators to draft precise and comprehensive legislation.162 One obvious example 
is blockchain technology itself, which may be referred to as ‘the blockchain’ or 
‘blockchain’, ‘distributed ledger technology’,163 ‘distributed registry technology’,164 
‘shared ledger technology’,165 ‘consensus ledger technology’,166 ‘mutual distributed 
ledger technology’,167 and a ‘decentralised’ or ‘distributed database’.168 There is a 
similar va riety of terms relating to public and private blockchains, to parties involved 
in operating the databases or ledgers and to digital assets.
Some of the terms used by countries to reference cryptocurrency include ‘digital 
currency’ (Argentina, Thailand, and Australia),169 ‘virtual commodity’ (Canada, 
China, and Taiwan),170 ‘crypto-token’ (Germany),171 ‘payment token’ (Switzerland, 
United Kingdom),172 ‘cyber currency’ (Italy and Lebanon),173 ‘electronic currency’ 
(Colombia and Lebanon),174 and ‘virtual asset’ (Honduras and Mexico).175 This dis-
parity in terms has two consequences: first, it can make regulators dependent on 
industry experts and thereby increase the risk of regulatory capture and under-regu-
lation.176 Second, if restrictions are proposed for a particular cryptocurrency, it could 
evade legislation simply by changing its form or name. A diverging terminology 
between regulatory regimes could further lead to inconsistent regulation that could 
be exploited by regulated parties through forum shopping and regulatory arbitrage.177 
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It could also increase the costs for users of the market and stifle innovation.178 Stand-
ardisation of the blockchain industry is needed as well as better tools that have been 
certified by governments to manage crypto accounting.179 ISO standards could define 
a common lexicon on what is a blockchain and although this standardisation would 
not be mandatory, it could allow a certified company to use it as a marketing argu-
ment, and to play an active role in ensuring other actors also comply with the stand-
ards. 
4.1.3. Substantial Problems in Experimenting with the Regulation of a Dispersed 
Architecture
Beyond terminology problems, blockchain regulation is made difficult by the dis-
persed architecture of the technology, the lack of obvious links between an event 
occurring on the blockchain and a particular jurisdiction, and the increasing numbers 
of autonomous entities based on smart contracts, which are not traditional legal enti-
ties.180 These challenges are particularly evident for public blockchains, especially 
when commercial transactions incorporate smart contracts and artificial intelligence.181 
Conventional means could suffice to solve legal challenges related to private block-
chains, as this kind of DLT is simply a decentralised register managed by a closed 
group of entities.182 Without any legal precedent in this area, regulators should resort 
to experiment and address issues on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, they should 
take a coherent approach and anticipate solutions to problems that are likely to emerge 
in the future. Such a coordinated and visionary approach is not simple because indi-
vidual states may not coordinate their legislation, and actions may appear disorgan-
ised. The main global attempt to discuss the issue in depth was at the G20 summit 
held in Buenos Aires in 2018, where the Financial Stability Board called for ‘further 
international coordination’ and ‘enhanced monitoring’.183 Leaders resolved to address 
money-laundering and terrorist financing risks by regulating crypto-assets in line with 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards.184 The first global standards were 
introduced in June 2019 by the FATF but the way these new requirements are actu-
ally implemented still needs to be assessed.185
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V. Conclusion
One of the main features of cryptocurrency is that it has decentralised elements that 
can bypass government regulation. This is a benefit that enhances exchanges at the 
cross-border level, enabling bureaucratic barriers erected by states to be avoided. The 
exaggerated promotion of cryptocurrency in recent years is not necessarily linked 
with the perceived positive benefits, and its fall from favour is largely due to a lack 
of governance, because many of its uses have been associated with illegal or illegiti-
mate activities. A review of the current regulatory approach among major jurisdictions 
shows that cryptocurrency, rather than providing a solution to a legal problem, gener-
ates further legal and regulatory problems that need to be tackled. A decentralised 
approach to regulation would not provide market confidence but could instead create 
further opportunities for illegitimate and illegal operators to explore ways to benefit 
from cross-border transactions. It is argued that public chain cryptoassets should not 
be recognised as a legal tender, however, money laundering law and tax law should 
apply to capture illegal activities by using cryptoassets. Cryptoasset exchanges should 
comply with KYC and AML requirements to for anti-money laundering and fraud 
prevention. In order to protect the consumers, the market abuse regime should also 
apply to exchanges. Exchanges should have a system to protect consumers by safe-
keeping the ‘points/tokens’ in the user’s wallet. Furthermore, cryptocurrency being 
used as benchmark should be banned for retail investors due to the absence of a reli-
able basis for valuing the underlying assets, the extreme volatility in cryptoasset prices 
movements, the frequent market abuses and financial crimes in the secondary market 
for cryptoassets, as well as the inadequate product knowledge of most retail investors. 
Finally, if merchants already accept cryptoassets as payment, consumers should be 
warned about the associated risks before contracting. Consumer protection law should 
apply to contracts in which cryptoassets have been used as a means of payment. If a 
merchant fails to deliver the goods, the consumer could then demand compensation 
with fiat money. 
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